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ABSTRACT
The increasing number of satellites in orbit and the upcoming deployment of constellations of hundreds of
small satellites raises the problem of orbital debris and saturation of main LEO and GEO orbits. Currently, about
sixty percent of satellites are deorbited at their end of life, including thirty percent deliberately with a propulsion
system. The increase in the number of debris has led to the implementation of preventive and corrective actions at
an international level to ensure the availability and safety of these orbits for future space projects. It therefore
appears necessary to guarantee with the best estimate possible the operations of passivation and withdrawal of
service for satellites in orbit at their end of life.
This paper presents and illustrates  with the case of the French National Space Agency’s scientific satellite
TARANIS based on the Myriade microsatellite generic platform  different approaches to improve satellite
reliability model. They are based on Bayesian and Chi-Square techniques that rely on operations feedback in order
to provide a more realistic risk assessment, closer to the value statistically observed in orbit.
This will lead to a better compliance to space debris national and international standards  as the French Law
on Space Operations or the ISO Space Systems - Space Debris Mitigation Requirements  concerning end-of-life
operations. That way, it will guarantee a safe access and operations in space for future missions by limiting the
proliferation of space debris in already crowded Earth orbits.
Acronyms:
AOCS = Attitude and Orbit Control System
CAD = Computer-Aided Design
CTA = Active Thermal Control
EEE = Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical
FIT = Failure In Time
FR = Failure Rate
GS = Solar Generator
LEO = Low Earth Orbit
LOS = French Law on Space Operations
MAG = Magnetometer
MEGS = Solar Generator drive Mechanism
MTB = Magneto Torquer Bar
MTTF = Mean Time To Failure
OBC = On Board Computer
PCDU = Power Conditioning and Distribution Unit
P/F = Platform
RW = Reaction Wheel
SST = Standard Star Tracker
REX = Experience feedback
RX = Receiver
R&T = Research and Technology
SAS = Sun Analog Sensor
SPOF = Single Point Of Failure
TX = Transmitter

I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, with the constantly increasing
number of space debris  especially in LEO  and after
recent in orbit collisions between active and defunct
satellites, several international organizations of big
space nations have established standards to encourage
global efforts to deal with this issue. They require,
among others:
- To avoid the release of Mission Related Objects
into Earth orbit during the operations;
- To avoid break-ups in Earth orbits during
operations and after the end of the mission by
passivating all the sources of energy stored on
board;
- To remove spacecraft and launch vehicles orbital
stages from the LEO through a controlled re-entry
or an uncontrolled one within 25 years, and GEO
protected regions through maneuvers to a higher
orbit of about 200km;
- To perform the necessary actions to minimize the
risk of collision with other space objects.
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In this context, the probability of successful service
withdrawal is a major requirement.
It directly determines the long-term evolution of the
debris population in flight: all the simulations carried
out by the agencies as part of the IADC (Inter-Agency
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Space Debris Coordination Committee) studies were
carried out with a success rate set at 90% (percentage
of satellite withdraw versus population of end-of-life
satellites).
It also determines the criteria for deorbitation at the end
of the mission with regard to the events (anomalies,
breakdowns, etc.) experienced by the satellite.
II. SATELLITE END-OF-LIFE OPERATIONS
1.

Withdrawal from Service

The value currently set by the 2017 Technical
Regulations for probability of success of carrying out
the withdrawal operations is 0.85.
Internationally, in ISO 24113:2019, the absolute
probability of successful withdrawal is 0.90.
The probability of 0.85 does not include the
availability of consumable energy resources which is
the subject of another clause.
The service withdrawal manoeuvers include the
following steps:
1.
-

-

2.

3.

Satellite deorbitation/re-orbitation to free the LEO
and GEO most used orbits:
If the implementation is done in protected
geosynchronous (GEO) regions: the satellite
withdrawal operations must be such that it cannot
return to the protected area naturally within 100
years.
If the implementation is in the protected Low
Earth Orbit (LEO): the satellite withdrawal
operations must be such that it must no longer be
present in LEO orbit within 25 years after the end
of the mission. The satellites are designed to carry
out an atmospheric reentry within 25 years after
their end of operational life.
The fluid passivation of the satellite: It
corresponds to the emptying of the propellants and
to the depressurization of all the pressurized
systems present in the satellite, such as the
chemical propulsion systems and plasma too. At
the end of the fluid passivation, the resulting
pressure must not exceed a few bars (in
concordance with the technical regulations).
The electric passivation of the satellite: It
corresponds to the definitive de-energization of all
systems and equipment of the satellite which
could either present risk for the integrity of the
satellite or disturb other orbital objects. This
includes:
- The shutdown and isolation of all actuators
(AOCS) such as reaction wheels or
gyroscopic actuators.
- The shutdown of all equipment capable of
transmitting (RF).
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Disconnection and isolation of the battery and
of all other sources of electricity generation
(solar generator for example).

In summary, the probability of successful withdrawal
of service is considered to be the reliability of the
satellite resources necessary for withdrawal of service
under the conditions specified previously.
This study is generally done in interface with the
system engineers and electrical and propulsion
architects of the project in order to identify the
minimum architecture necessary to carry out the end of
life operations of the satellite.
The main difficulty of the study is to have access to the
failure rates of the equipment necessary for these
operations. Therefore, it is needed to anticipate the
end-of-life probability success calculation from the
preliminary design stages, by choosing components
and equipment for which the suppliers have carried out
reliability studies, tests or have already flown long
enough. As a last resort, it is also possible to make
relevant and justified analogies - based on expert
judgment - with equipment from satellites that have
already flown.
2.

Evaluation of the Satellite Reliability

This part presents the methodology to evaluate the
satellite reliability  needed to calculate the probability
of successful end-of-life operations  with the highest
precision possible thanks to various mathematical
models.
a.

Theoretical Reliability

The theoretical reliability assessment of a satellite is
based on the following hypotheses:
-

During the mission, the components are assumed
to have constant failure rates (λ), and to be able to
fail independently of each other.
The exponential law is used to calculate the
reliability (R) according to the formulas 1, 2 and
3:

-
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-

The failure rate of elements that are not in
operation (𝜆 ) is assumed to be 1/10 of the
failure rate (𝜆 ) for EEE components.
For equipment with a duty cycle (α) other than
100%, an equivalent failure rate is calculated
using the formula 4:
𝜆
= 𝛼 ∗ 𝜆 + (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝜆
(4)

However, the results of this method are always very
pessimistic regarding with the real performances of the
satellites. Indeed, the main source of uncertainty of the
method comes from the MIL-HDBK-217 standard
which is the most widely used empirical reliability
prediction model for electronic equipment.
This military handbook was developed in 1961 with
the purpose of establishing and maintaining consistent
and uniform methods to estimate the inherent
reliability of military electronic equipment and
systems.
However, it is not updated since 1995, and incomplete
since new components, technologies and quality
improvements are not covered. As a result, actual inorbit performance has often showed largely
conservative results leading to potential overdesign,
reduced performance and cost effectiveness of satellite
design.
Some R&T had been conducted by the French agency
and Space industrials  Airbus Defence and Space and
Thales Alenia Space  in order to update and revitalize
the MIL-HDBK-217 standard in recent years and a
Reliability models extensions User Guide has been
published. However, the handbook remains quite
pessimistic even with this update.
b.

REX and Bayesian Techniques

A forecast estimate of equipment reliability can be
consolidated by taking into account the effective
operating life of identical equipment, operating since
its launch in similar environments and conditions of
use (including temperature), by application of
Bayesian techniques  as illustrated on Figure 1 :

The reliability is characterized by a Poisson
distribution, i.e. the probability of obtaining k failures
during a cumulative time T is proportional to:

𝑓(𝑘 / 𝜆, 𝑇) =

(

)
!

(5)

𝑒

with λ the failure rate (the unknown parameter to
estimate).
In our case, we have “a priori” information: the
theoretical reliability estimate. These assessments are
considered to be performed at 60% confidence. By
considering this theoretical failure rate no longer as a
simple value but as a random variable, it is possible to
consider a law "a priori".
For a Poisson distribution, it is possible to consider a
law “a priori” Gamma, which is the conjugate of the
Poisson law:
𝑘

𝜆 𝑇𝑘+1𝑒−𝜆𝑇
𝑘!

𝑔(𝜆 / 𝑘, 𝑇) =

(6)

The formula 6 can also be expressed by formula 7, i.e.
a Gamma law with parameters 𝛼 = 𝑘 + 1 and 𝛽 = 𝑇,
because Γ(k+1) = k!:

𝑔(𝜆 / 𝛼, 𝛽) =

(7)

Γ( )

The scale parameter 𝛽 is then equal to 𝛼/𝜆 because
𝐸(𝜆) = 𝛼/𝛽 and the shape parameter α can be
calculated by solving the equation of formula 8 for a
level of confidence of n%:
𝐹

𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝑛%, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝛼/𝛽

(8)

α = 1.765156924 for a 60% confidence level of the
estimation.
The a priori law can be enriched by REX data (k
failures during a cumulative period T) and lead to the
“a posteriori” distribution of formula 9.
(

𝑔(𝜆/𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑘, 𝑇) =

(

)

)

= 𝛤(𝛽 + 𝑇, 𝛼 + 𝑘)

(9)
The point estimator of the λbayesian failure rate is the
average value of the Gamma distribution “a
posteriori”.

𝜆

=

(10)

where k = number of failures; T = total operating time
in hours.

Figure 1: Principle of Bayesian inference
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In this way the Formula 10 permits to combine a
theoretical reliability with operation results of similar
equipment in order to consolidate the satellite
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reliability  as shown for the case of TARANIS in
Chapter III.
c.

REX and Chi-Square Method

Another classic approach to compute the failure rates
of one unit from the REX, test or in orbit data, is the
Chi-Square distribution. When assuming that the life
of the device follows an exponential law with constant
failure rate (λ) and that failures are independent, the
statistic “twice the total test time T divided by the mean
life (θ = 1/λ)” is distributed as a Chi-Square χ² (α, n)
where α is the confidence level and n the degree of
freedom:
∗

𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 >

( ∗

)

(11)

where T = Total operating time in hours; 1 − 𝛼 =
Confidence and k = Number of failures.
And so the estimator of the failure rate is defined by
the formula 12:

𝜆

=

𝜒

(2 ∗ 𝑘 + 2)
2∗𝑇
(12)

This model is useful when a lot of equipment’s
operating data is available  for satellite constellations
using the same platform for example. When the total
operating time is small, the estimation is very
pessimistic and not reflecting the reality. This method
will also be illustrated in the next chapter with the
satellite TARANIS, using a generic microsatellite
platform Myriade.

Figure 2: Transient luminous events observed by
TARANIS
The satellite will be launched this year (end of 2020)
on a sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 700
kilometers.
The reliability of the functions necessary for
TARANIS end of life operations must be better than
0.85 at the end of the mission duration.
This TARANIS mission duration in orbit is 62 months
(5 years and 2 months) counted as follows:
- Satellite Launch and Early Orbit Phase and fine
positioning: 0.5 month;
- In-flight commissioning: 2.5 months;
- Routine phase: 45.0 months;
- Mission extension: 12.0 months;
- Disposal phase: 2.0 months.
2.

Satellite Architecture

The TARANIS satellite is associating a Myriade
microsatellite platform and a payload including the
scientific instruments.

III. TARANIS END-OF-LIFE OPERATIONS
1.

Satellite Presentation

TARANIS (Tool for the Analysis of RAdiation from
lightNIng and Sprites) is an observation microsatellite
of the French Space Agency CNES which will study
the transient luminous events that form over the clouds
during thunderstorms around the globe.
The TARANIS mission is dedicated to study the
magnetosphere-ionosphere-atmosphere coupling via
transient processes.
The TARANIS satellite will observe all the emissions
above thunderstorm and will allow to simultaneously
measure:
- Transient Luminous Events (TLEs)
- Terrestrial Gamma-ray Flashes (TGFs)
- Electric and Magnetic emissions,
- Runaways electrons beams.
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Figure 3: TARANIS CAD model
a.

Scientific Payload

The TARANIS scientific payload is constituted by the
instruments:
- MCP, a set of 2 cameras and 3 photometers
measuring the luminance in several spectral bands at
high resolution;
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- XGRE, a set of 3 detectors to measure high energy
photons (20 keV to 10 MeV) and relativistic electrons
(1 MeV to 10 MeV);
- IDEE, a set of 2 electron detectors to measure their
spectrum between 70 keV to 4 MeV together with their
pitch angle;
- IME-BF, a low frequency antenna to measure the
electric field to a frequency up to 3.3 MHz;
- IME-HF, a high frequency antenna to measure the
electric field at frequencies of 100 kHz to 30 MHz;
- IMM, a tri-axis magnetometer to measure the
magnetic field.
b.

Myriade Platform

The TARANIS platform is based on the Myriade
Microsatellites Series recurrent product line, using a
new “200kg” structure. It includes the support
functions for in flight operations as provision of
electrical power, command and data handling,
telecommunications, thermal control and propulsion
for orbit maneuvers:
- Propulsion system
- GS panels
- MEGS
- Battery
- On Board Computer
- Magnetometer
- Sun Analog Sensors
- Reaction Wheels
- Stellar Sensor
- Gyrometers
- S-band transmitters (in passive redundancy ½)
- S-band receivers (in active redundancy ½)
- S-band antenna
- X-band transmitter and antenna
- Active Thermal Control
3.

Presentation of the Problematic

At the end of the TARANIS mission, the satellite will
be deorbited and then passived.
In this case the desorbitation consists in lowering the
orbit altitude of the satellite, allowing it to enter the
atmosphere in less than 25 years.
In order to be able to perform these desorbiting
maneuvers:
- The Payload and interface circuits on the Platform
side are not necessary;
- The resources allocated to the Payload will allow us
to consider additional redundancies for the Solar
Generator;
- All other satellite functions and equipment are
required.
The fluid passivation is ensured by a procedure
allowing the emptying of the propellant which does not
differ from the nominal procedures.
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The electrical passivation is ensured by a discharge of
the battery, an orientation of the GS back to the sun and
an opening of the GS sections.
The probability of success of the satellite end-of-life
operations is the reliability of the system previously
identified composed by all the required equipment to
perform these operations.
4.

Theoretical Reliability of the Satellite

For platform equipment the development was largely
based on equipment purchased "off the shelf”, for
which the directives given to equipment manufacturers
were to deliver for information  when it existed  the
reliability documentation available from previous
programs.
Thus, the failure rates of the equipment considered in
Table 1 come either from supplier data or from analogy
with other programs.
Table 1: Reliability estimation of the TARANIS
platform
System

Equipment

Avionics

OBC
GS
PCDU
Power
Battery
MEGS
Rx
Tx
TTC
chain
Antennas
Diplexer
Thermal
CTA
RW (X, Y1
et Z)
RW (Y2)
MAG
MTB
SCAO
SAS
SST
Gyrometer
Propulsion

Failure rate
[FIT]
1550
100
1175
110
830
1160
830
204
10
300

Use rate

Quantity

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
10%
100%
100%
100%

1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1

1304

100%

3

1304
412
7
15
500
5815
1524

10%
100%
100%
100%
100%
1%
10%

1
1
3
3
1
1
1

With these data and using Formulas 1, 2 and 3, the
following results are obtained concerning the
theoretical reliability of the TARANIS platform
(without and with the one-year mission extension):
P/F Reliability (for LOS)
@ 4 years and 2 months

@ 5 years et 2 months

0.68

0.62

These numbers are very pessimistic in comparison
with the results of previous missions based on a
Myriade Platform and are not enough to respect the
specification of 0.85 previously defined.
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5.

Bayesian Reliability

The Bayesian method previously defined is used to
consolidate the theoretical failure rates.
These techniques allow the theoretical values of failure
rates to be combined with the REX Myriade.
Thus, the “a priori” failure rate, considered with a level
of confidence of 60%, constitutes the “a priori”
knowledge.
The Myriade REX indicates that the cumulative time
in operating orbit of the Myriade platforms reaches 31
years and 4 months (i.e. T = 469,440 hours of
operation) without failure (k = 0). For equipment in
several copies, the overall operating time is multiplied
by their number (taking into account the rate of use).
Some equipment such as MEGS and SST not being
present on Myriade “minimal” type platforms, the
operating time is only 269,000 hours. For Myriade
Wheels, we find in the REX that the cumulative
operating time reaches 145 years and 4 months (T =
1,273,080 h).

In order to improve it, it is possible to group all the
equipment in series to have a less pessimistic estimate
of the reliability:
Table 3: Adjusted and grouped reliability data for
the TARANIS platform
Equipment

Failure
rate [FIT]

System

Equipment

Failure rate
[FIT]

Avionic

OBC
GS
PCDU
Power
Battery
MEGS
Rx
Tx
TTC chain
Antennas
Diplexer
Thermal
CTA
RW (X, Y1
et Z)
RW (Y2)
MAG
MTB
SCAO
SAS
SST
Gyrometer
Propulsion

1550
100
1175
110
830
1160
830
204
10
300

New
Cumulative
Failure
operation time
Rate [FIT]
469 440
1100
469 440
98
469 440
895
469 440
107
269 000
737
938 880
887
93 888
812
938 880
184
469 440
10
469 440
278

1304

1 273 080

672

1304
412
7
15
500
5815
1524

1 273 080
469 440
1 408 320
1 408 320
269 000
4694
46 944

672
371
7
15
465
5727
1465

Quantity

New
Cumulative
Failure
operation
Rate
time
[FIT]

Grouping of
equipment
in series

9305

100%

1

269 000

3848
107

Battery

110

100%

1

469 440

String GS

100

100%

1

469 440

98

Rx

1160

100%

2

938 880

887

Tx

830

2%

2

93 888

812

where (FR is the Failure Rate in FITS):
𝐹𝑅
= 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅
= 9305 𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆

Thus, using Formula 6, this recalibration makes it
possible to obtain much better posterior failure rates:
Table 2: Adjusted reliability data for the
TARANIS platform

Use
rate

+ 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅

In this case the new results are better:
P/F Reliability (for LOS)
@ 4 years and 2 months

@ 5 years et 2 months

0.87

0.84

The specification (0.85) is respected for a 4 years and
2 months’ nominal mission, without mission
extension. This method is not enough to demonstrate
the 0.85 probability with a mission extension of one
year.
6.

Chi-Square Reliability

For a platform with so much REX as Myriade, the most
efficient way method is the Chi-Square technique, that
uses only REX and no theoretical values.
By application of the Formula 12 with T = 269 000 h
and a confidence level of 60%, it is possible to obtain
the 𝜆
. The evolution of TARANIS platform
reliability (an exponential law with parameter
𝜆
) in time is given in Figure 4:

With the new failure rate values recalculated using
Bayesian techniques, the following values are obtained
for the Platform reliability using Formulas 1, 2 and 3:
P/F Reliability (for LOS)
@ 4 years and 2 months

@ 5 years et 2 months

0.76

0.71

The estimation is less pessimist but still not enough to
respect the specification.
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P/F Reliability (for LOS)
@ 4 years and 2 months

@ 5 years et 2 months

0.88

0.86

The Chi-Square technique allowed to demonstrate the
needed probability of successful TARANIS’ end-oflife operations  even with the one-year mission
extension  that was needed to obtain the authorization
for the launch of the satellite.
IV. CONCLUSION
A successful End-of-life disposal and the compliance
to Space Debris laws and requirements are issue of
interest and importance for space agencies such as the
CNES.
The different approaches presented in the publication
to overpass uncertainties of the current reliability
models using experience feedback are expected to lead
to more realistic figures and therefore to better
decisions for the need of a disposal or a possible life
extension for example.
Being able to dispose a satellite in a safe and reliable
manner has a fundamental importance in order to limit
the exponential proliferation of space debris in already
crowded orbits.
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